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| by Editor Erik Wait |
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In addition to understanding philosophical issues in general in relation to apologetics we need to understand some specific issues in epistemology. Epistemology is that subdivision of philosophy that is concerned with a theory of knowledge. In the apologetics the dialogue does not merely revolve around different opinions but how do we know what we we believe in. Thus all apologetical situations are, at their core, a matter of how we account, justify, what we know and believe. Thus whether we are dialoguing with an atheist, Muslim, a Hindu, or a member of a religious cult we are dealing with their assertion “I believe in X, and I know it to be true because of Y.” At the center of their assertion is their clam to know it to be true thus epistemology (one’s theory of knowledge and how we know things) is a central issue. Epistemology thus deals with such issues as truth, evidence, and belief. The apologist should not take for granted that there is a common view of knowledge, language, logic, and evidence amongst nonbelievers. If there was a common view on these issues religious issues could easily be settled but it is because there is NOT a common view on these most basic issues which underlie meaningful discourse that the unbeliever maintains his worldview. Thus the apologist should not think of the unbeliever as one who should be able to just look at the facts and come to the right conclusion. The fundamental issue separating us from the unbeliever is epistemological; how one accounts for what one believes.
The Various Kinds of Epistemology
The word epistemology comes from the Greek word episteme + logos (to know +study) which means a theory of knowledge.
What do we mean when we say that we know something? “To know” has many various meanings as there are many different objects and depths of knowledge. We speak of knowing truths or claims (propositions), we speak of knowing in the sense of having ability, such as knowing how to do something. We also speak of knowing someone, having a relation or acquaintance with someone. Thus there is a theoretical knowledge as well as a personal relationship aspect of knowledge. Thus knowing God salvifically is not merely a mental assertion but is a relational knowledge. However, to know relationally cannot be divorced from intellectual propositions. In order to know God relationally one must know something about him as He has revealed Himself.
What do we mean when we say that we believe something? A belief is a positive cognitive attitude toward a proposition, an action guiding mental state on which a person relies whether intermittently or continuously in his theoretic inferences or practical actions and plans. Sometimes we speak of a mental belief while at other times we speak of belief as a mental event which causes us to do something. Belief is also sometimes in a degree of belief tainted by doubt. But while beliefs may change from one moment to the next or inconsistently they guide our actions.
Sometimes the mental state we call “belief” is quiescent, that is, it is a disposition so that in certain circumstances we may behave, verbalize, or infer things though currently we are not giving any indications of that belief. Also, though our belief may take at times an active mode, that belief may only be periodic depending on certain circumstances. Thus the activity of a belief may only be periodic. However, the mental state’s causal capacity to effect my mental,verbal, or bodily activity is not dependent stimulus (as behaviorism suggests) for we can choose to start thinking about certain things according to our beliefs.
In the Bible knowledge is not separated from belief. In fact in Titus 1:1 they are interchangeable terms and we see in 1 John 4:16 that knowledge entails belief. In Hebrew 11:1 we see that “... faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.” Belief (faith) is toward propositions which have been heard or read (Romans 10:14) Sometimes in the Bible belief is treated as a datable event and at other times it is treated as a continuing state of mind (Romans 13:15). But that state of mind is sometimes temporary that goes away (Luke 8:13; Hebrews 10: 35 ) Sometimes faith is an enduring quality. Of course when comes from God (Ephesians 2:8 ) and thus is true saving faith it endures, but when it comes from the flesh is withers away. While the true believer may wane in his faith there is another sense in which it is continuously operative in the believer (1 Timothy 6:12; 2 Timothy 4:7).
In the Bible belief has degrees on confidence “I do believe; help my unbelief.” (Mark 9:24) and at other times believers have such a confidence that it cannot be shaken. Belief in the Bible find expression your mental inferences in the conclusions you draw (Hebrews 11:3), in what you confess that you believe (Romans 10:9-10) as well as in your practical behavior (James 2:14-20). Finally, there is a sense in which faith is not just a passive stimuli but it is exercised as well as it is morally imposed on me that they are required to exercise to believe, even though the sinner is born dead in sin. However, though someone may believe a certain proposition is knowledge for one can believe contrary to what is true. What is true must conform to (1) What is the case (2) Conforms to the facts (3) Accords with the actual state of affairs. However, in dealing with theories of truth in epistemology is not so simple as to say that truth is “What conforms to the facts.” However, the different theories which have been offered by philosophers are not necessarily in conflict with each other because they may each be addressing different questions such as in the correspondence theory, the pragmatic theory, the semantic and performance theories etc. as they are not trying to force one to choose one over another.
The Correspondence Theory of Truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact — a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). This basic idea has been expressed in many ways, giving rise to an extended family of theories and, more often, theory sketches. The members of the family employ various concepts for the relevant relation (correspondence, conformity, congruence, agreement, accordance, copying, picturing, signification, representation, reference, satisfaction) and/or various concepts for the relevant portion of reality (facts, states of affairs, situations, events, objects, sequences of objects, sets, properties, tropes). The resulting multiplicity of versions and reformulations of the theory is due to a blend of substantive and terminological differences. The correspondence theory of truth is often associated with metaphysical realism. Its traditional competitors, coherentist, pragmatist, and verificationist theories of truth, are often associated with idealism, anti-realism, or relativism. In recent years, the traditional competitors have been virtually replaced (at least from publication-space) by deflationary theories of truth — and to a lesser extent by the identity theory — which now lead the attack against correspondence theories.
The Coherence Theory of Truth states that the truth of any (true) proposition consists in its coherence with some specified set of propositions. The coherence theory differs from its principal competitor, the correspondence theory of truth, in two essential respects. The competing theories give conflicting accounts of the relation between propositions and their truth conditions. (In this article, ‘proposition’ is not used in any technical sense. It simply refers to the bearers of truth values, whatever they may be.) According to one, the relation is coherence, according to the other, it is correspondence. The two theories also give conflicting accounts of truth conditions. According to the coherence theory, the truth conditions of propositions consist in other propositions. The correspondence theory, in contrast, states that the truth conditions of propositions are not (in general) propositions, but rather objective features of the world. (Even the correspondence theorist holds that propositions about propositions have propositions as their truth conditions.)
Pragmatic Theory of Truth holds (roughly) that a proposition is true if it is useful to believe. Utility is the essential mark of truth. Beliefs that lead to the best “payoff”, that are the best justification of our actions, that promote success, are truths, according to the pragmatists.
The Semantic Theory of Truth holds that any assertion that a sentence is true can be made only as a formal requirement regarding the language in which the proposition itself is expressed. The semantic conception of truth, which is related in different ways to both the correspondence and deflationary conceptions, is due to work published by Polish logician Alfred Tarski in the 1930s. Tarski, in "On the Concept of Truth in Formal Languages", attempted to formulate a new theory of truth in order to resolve the liar paradox . In the course of this he made several metamathematical discoveries, most notably Tarski's Indefinability Theorem , which is similar to Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem . Roughly, this states that the concept of “truth” for the sentences of a given language cannot consistently be defined within that language.
The Performative Theory of Truth argues that ascribing truth to a proposition is not really characterizing the proposition itself, nor is it saying something redundant. Rather, it is telling us something about the speaker's intentions . The speaker – through his or her agreeing with it, endorsing it, praising it, accepting it, or perhaps conceding it – is licensing our adoption of (the belief in) the proposition. Instead of saying, "It is true that snow is white", one could substitute "I embrace the claim that snow is white." The key idea is that saying of some proposition, P, that it is true is to say in a disguised fashion "I commend P to you", or "I endorse P", or something of the sort. The case may be likened somewhat to that of promising . When you promise to pay your sister five dollars, you are not making a claim about the proposition expressed by "I will pay you five dollars"; rather you are performing the action of promising her something. Similarly, according to the Performative Theory of Truth, when you say "It is true that Vancouver is north of Sacramento", you are performing the act of giving your listener license to believe (and to act upon the belief) that Vancouver is north of Sacramento.
What does the Christian say is true? Answer: Whatever conforms to the mind of God. Thus to know the truth is to think God’s thoughts after him and to know what is true is to know things as he has predetermined them. Jesus is the truth because He corresponds perfectly to the mind of God as the logos of God. To walk in the truth is to walk according to his revealed will which is not distinct from his character or a standard outside of Himself but is a reflection of His holiness.
There is a third concept which we need to be familiar with which is the concept of having evidence. We have discussed knowing, believing, proof, and now evidence. We have said that in order to know a propositions at least two propositions must be met. (1 ) The person must believe the propositions in question and (2) the propositions must be true. However, even this is an inadequate analysis of knowledge. To say that true belief is knowledge is too broad because sometimes a true belief can sometimes be arrived at with invalid means. One must be able to justify what one believes is true. Thus knowledge is justified, true, belief.
The human enterprise which we call “knowledge” or “science,” (in the broader sense), proceeds the goal of eliminating personal prejudice, unreasoning conjection, and distorting balance in our beliefs. Accordingly, having a warrant for one’s belief is essential for knowledge. This is why justification has always been a critical one throughout the history of the theory of knowledge. When and how are claims well founded? How do we acquire, or what is the source of, reliable beliefs? On what basis is intellectual authority conferred upon our ideas, by what standard, are judgments to be evaluated? How do we know that we know? Philosophers have differed as to what account for as good, adequate, or justifying evidence for beliefs.
It is one thing to have good evidence for belief and it is another to realize one’s evidence or be able to give one’s evidence to others. Thus people often know more than what they are able to say and some may not be able to give precise evidence for believing in something. This may be called “intuition” but is really a knowing from a prolonged experience on a given matter and yet being able to articulate how one knows something. Also, sometimes we may know something without knowing how we know or even that we know that something. If we do not know the epistemology that you should have then you do not know if your defense of the faith coincides with the faith being defended. What epistemology should Christians use to defend the faith?
Foundationalists and Certainty
20th Century Philosophers-
Bertrand Russell opened his own treatment on the problems in philosophy in 1912 by stating, “Is there any knowledge in the world that is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?” This question is one of the most difficult which can be asked when we have realized the obstacles of a straight forward and confident answer we shall be well launched on the study of philosophy. For philosophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions. Is there any knowledge in this world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it? The theory of knowledge, epistemology, is a critical issue in philosophy because we do merely ask what is reality and what moral obligations do we have, but how do we know that this is real and we should live this way? While epistemology is not the whole of philosophy it is the atmosphere of what we do. Is there any answer to the skeptic who says that no one knows anything?
Questions such as these have been key motives in studies of epistemology. The guiding spirit of the Vienna Circle and the founder of modern analytical philosophy of Morris Schlit wrote in 1934 in an article “The Foundation of Knowledge” wrote “All important attempts at establishing a theory of knowledge grow out of the problem concerning the certainty of human knowledge. And this problem in turn originate in the wish for absolute certainty . The insights of daily life and science can at best only be probable as again and again stimulated philosophers since ancient times search for an unshakable, indubitable foundation, a firm basis on which the uncertain structure of our knowledge could rest.”
Rationalism, Empiricism, Idealism, and other schools of philosophy are corporately known as “Foundationalist” schools of knowledge because they are looking for some foundation upon which everything else is built. The search for certain and infallible truths is common in all school’s quest for knowledge. Every school seeks to distinguishes between sense and nonsense and adjudicates between conflicting claims of what is true. All Foundationalist schools of knowledge have been superseded by two schools of thought: (1) Pragmatism (2) Linguistic analysis.
John Dewey is the classic example of Pragmatism and wrote a book on the quest for certainty. According to Dewey knowledge should no longer been understood in terms of theoretical justification of the things we believe but rather more activisticly in terms of man’s struggle to adapt to his environment, pragmatically not theoretically. What matters is whether or not it works, not whether one can answers the theoretical questions of the skeptic. This pragmatism has become dominant in the 20th century runs against a Foundationalist approach and instead says, “How does one justify one’s methodology? By the success of the ends.” [69]
Specifically in the case of John Dewey, our difficulty with his pragmatism approach to justifying knowledge claims is that it is not descriptively accurate. There are many propositions which has nothing to do with my behavior or response at all. How is a pragmatist to deal with a proposition which has no pragmatic ends? Thus they will then assert that what you want to talk about, the non-pragmatic, is not meaningful anyway. Thus for them “meaning” = the pragmatic. At the very heart of his pragmatism is a contradiction for on the one hand he says that everything is in flux and exchange all the time but on the other hand in order to know that something is true one must follow scientific procedures which must apply to everything. But if everything is changing then what is scientific is changing as well and thus Dewey cannot have it both ways of everything in contingency and flux and yet also a world of universals and order. This is the rational-irrational tension in his and all other non-Christian systems of thought.
Pragmatism in general says that we should not be looking for certainty and a foundation for all other knowledge claims but we should rather be asking, “What approaches are beneficial for accomplishing our ends?” Thus Pragmatism is a consequentialist approach to the theory of knowledge. Thus things are known if you gain the consequences that you should desire then your positions is an exceptional theory. The problem is that there are so many different views of what a particular theory should be accomplishing: biological theories (survival of the race) sociological (establishment of a certain class of people; i.. communism), psychological (whatever helps the individual gain inner resolution and peace) etc. Thus if Pragmatism is a consequentialist theory ti should tell us what consequences we should pursue This is the moral dilemma of Pragmatism which assumes you should already know what we should be seeking to accomplish.
Analytical philosophy is another departure from the traditional “big questions” of epistemology. It teaches that the best we can do is a bisection and analysis of the way in which we use our language and try to work out the problems that have entered into our thinking because we misused our ways of speaking; we have taken language out of a natural context and put it into an artificial context. For example, in everyday normal language we know what time is and can make meaningful statements such as, “What time is it?” Traditional Philosophers on the other hand rip “time” out of its context in everyday normal usage and in turn ask such questions as, “What is time ?” Now we are confused as to the meaning of time and thus Analytical philosophers state we ought not to get bogged down with such theoretical discourse and create problems that don’t exist at all. Thus Ludwig Wittgenstein stated that the job of the philosopher is to let the fly out of the fly bottle; it is all worked up buzzing around in the bottle but if we would merely take the top off and set the fly free we would find solutions to apparent philosophical problems. Thus Analytical philosophy seeks to put concepts back into their ordinary discourse and analyze them within their context. Thus Analytical philosophy recognizes that there is a world view in which one uses language. Unfortunately Wittgenstein was then led by this into subjectivism for he concluded that there is no objective universal truth, there are just many ways which people use language and has psychologized away certainty.
The Christian solution to the problem of epistemological certainty is to answer the question, “What preconditions are necessary for intelligibility?” Van Til answers that it is only the Christian world view which can answer the question. Only the Christian world view can give a foundation for causality and logic and provide an objectivity for truth and knowledge. Epistemology points to the fact that true knowledge is “Christ Himself, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.” (Colossians 2:2-3). The quest for certainty can only be resolved if men with start with fearing the Lord (Proverbs 1:7).
Harry Frankfurt in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy in an article on “Doubt” answering the question “Is there anything that is indoubtitable, that cannot be doubted?” wrote, “The claim that a basis for doubt is inconceivable is justified whenever a denial of the claim would violate the conditions or presuppositions of rational inquiry.”
A number of philosophers continue to defend, or try to, over against pragmatism or a transcendental approach in an alleged presuppositionalist-inductive-empirical approach to knowledge. In the western world there is persistent attempt to hold on to an empiricist way of knowledge, “To know thing is to experience it” “The facts speak for themselves” etc. One of the most popular critiques of Christianity is the assertion that it is not even meaningful for there is no empirical experience that verifies or falsifies the claims of Christianity. Thus even though David Hume slew British Empiricism they continue to take a presuppositionalist-inductive-empirical approach and even worse many Christian apologists assume the same methodology.
As a Christian philosopher, what do I want to say about an empirical theory of knowledge? As a Christian I would affirm that God has created us to learn and know things from observation and thus it is appropriate to know things from experience. The Bible assumes that we can know things about the world (the situation) when it requires that we apply to it normatives (the Law of God). Thus as a Christian we are not to be anti-empirical, we do use observation about the world but we are not committed to empiricISM. Empiricism says that we can only know the particulars and thus cannot make any universal statements. Empiricism says that all knowledge is observational. Yet, empiricism itself is not observed and thus empiricism is self-refuting. So how can one claim that all knowledge if one cannot observe the nature of empiricism. The uniformity of nature, the uniformity of the future is not something anyone can know observationally. Thus empiricism must assume (presuppose) the uniformity of the future in order for its system to be workable. Numbers, mathematics,ethics, and the laws of logic are not known observationally. “2” or “II” are numerals which are ways of expressing the number “two” and are not numbers in and of themselves. Numbers themselves are not observational. Personal identity, substances, generalizations, class ideas, are not known observationally. History is not known observationally. It is not being, and cannot be, known observationally. Therefore we cannot transcend individual experiences or have a public common experience. Observational approaches to knowledge presuppose the trustworthiness and normalness of the knower. In fact “normal” cannot be observed. Observation is always relative to the position of the knower, which itself cannot be known observationally apart from its relation to something else.
The Empirical Dogma of Analytic-Synthetic Distinction of Truth [70]
While this is really a continuation of the above critique of empiricism, as a theory, what follows is an introduction to a discussion of advanced epistemological theory. For more information read “Revisionary Immunity” by Greg Bahnsen.
Dogma #1 - “All of the truth that we know are either of the Analytic or Synthetic form.” The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction is presupposed by all empirical theories of knowledge. According to the analytic/synthetic distinction the truth which we know all break down to being analytic (known upon analysis) or synthetic (drawing together elements of our experience). For example, “the barn is a barn” is true by analysis without examining barns for it is an analytic truth of the law of identity “A is A.” The statement “the barn is red” is not true by analysis but only by synthesizing experiences of the barn and “redness.”
Empiricism And Revisionary Immunity
The analytic/synthetic distinctions is a way of specifying what truths are immune from revision, as a way of pointing out which truth can be isolated and put into a special category and deemed infallible. The analytic/synthetic distinction is used by empiricists to argue anything that is true in value must be of the analytical sort. Only analytical sorts are immune from revision and infallible. Anything that is not analytic is synthetic and therefore always subject to revision based upon further experience. Thus all analytic truths become infallible and all synthetic truths must be open best to probability assessments and thus are not infallible. The evidentialist “apologist” has bought into the analytic/synthetic distinctions methodology and thus must assert that Christianity and the Bible are only possibly certain. However, the analytic/synthetic distinction cannot hold up to its own criteria for truth for the necessity of analytic truth is itself not of an empirical nature.
The Greatness of Divine Wisdom
The theme of apologetics is the call to defend the greatness of Divine Wisdom and in this lesson we will continue to look at the theory of apologetics and in following lessons look at the practice of apologetics. John Calvin wrote in his commentary on 1 Peter 3:15 these words:
“Contentious disputes arise from the fact that many think less honorably than they ought of the greatness of Divine Wisdom and are carried away by profane audacity.”
A truly Christian defense of the faith must never fail to exalt Christ as Lord over all. And if He is Lord over all He must be lord over argumentation and reasoning as well. An apologetic that builds on any other rock than Christ does not honor the greatness of Divine Wisdom. It foolishly, as Calvin would say, audaciously is erected on the sand of human authority. The task of apologetics must be exercised then upon the infallible and presupposed authority of the Word of Christ in Scripture. Apologetics does not first do obeisance to human philosophy and human science and then proceed to encompass God within its sphere of reverence. The Christian cannot take a neutral stand with respect to his faith in order to win the unbeliever over to Christ’s authority. A Christian apologetic grows out of and is shaped according to a total dedication to the wisdom of the Logos, the wisdom of God, as we find it developed in Scripture. Hebrews 10:23 states, “Let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering for He who promised is faithful.” Since God is faithful to us we must not be faithless to Him, we must not waver with respect to the hope He has given us. 1 Peter 3: 15 says it is for, “ ...the hope that is in you...” and Hebrews tells that hope is to be held “without wavering.” Thus we cannot give up our hope in a supposed neutrality in order to defend it. Christian apologetics must therefore begin with Him who is the A (alpha) and the W (omega), who only and always reigns as my Lord. A presuppositional approach to apologetics is the only faithful methodology to defending the hope that is within you and Biblical message. All non-presuppositional approach to apologetics assert that we ought not to start distinctively Christian in our thinking and method though we ought to end up that way.
Apologists who seek a neutrality in their approach have brought their faith raised to the ground of those who postulated that bare possibility is a principle more ultimate than God, that man’s reasoning is self-sufficient: Deterministic science disqualified miracles, positivistic sociology relativized morality, historical criticism faulted the Bible, Kant’s transcendental dialecticism invalidated cognitive revelation, idealism made God finite, pragmatism made Him irrelevant, logical analysis made him meaningless, process philosophy limited God pulling Him down from His throne of sovereignty and pulled everything else up into God as a pan-antheistic drive to the omega point, phenomenology made the universe into a machine for fabricating gods, existentialism declared “Man is the being who strives to become god himself.” By appealing to probability apologists see Christianity relegated to the realm of the museum of religious hypothesis, mere possibilities, rather than embraces the actual truth that embraces God.
These methodologies honor the greatness of the foolishness of the natural man in order to pull him up to the greatness of Divine Wisdom. In contrast to these methodologies we ought to never soften the antithesis between the unbelieving and the Christian world view. We must avoid the Platonism of the early apologists who said, “Plato got it right, but Moses God there before he did!” We must avoid the Aristotelianism as the scholastics of the Middle Ages did, we must avoid the embracing rationalism as did the men of the enlightenment. We must avoid embracing Kantianism or existentialism as do modern thinkers. By catering to the non-Christian assumptions the Christian will see his message absorbed into its diametric opposite as a result of its alien methodology.
By presupposing the Sovereign Creator and the Word of Christ as the requisite transcendental (the necessary precondition for intelligibility) in any intellectual endeavor, the apologist can and must expose the fatal defect of all autonomous reasoning. The truly Reformed apologetic must presuppose that the triune God speaks to him with absolute authority in infallible Scripture. Following God’s Word the Christian receptively reconstructs the created facts of the universe about him with a view toward fulfilling the cultural mandate being conformed in the image of his Savior by the power of the Spirit of Christ. The apologetic task will consist therefore not of verifying the Christian presupposition but in applying the Christian presupposition.
How do I apply the presupposition of Scripture? (1) I Bring God’s truth and commands to bear upon the lives of unbelievers, appealing to the image of God in them, pointing out that every fact of the world bears witness to God. (2) I do an internal critique of the non-Christian system of thinking, pulling down its idols of autonomy, pointing out the necessity of the Christian presupposition.
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